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Abstract 
This paper improves upon recent game-theoretic 
deceptive signaling schemes for cyber defense using 
the insights emerging from a cognitive model of human 
cognition. One particular defense allocation algorithm 
that uses a deceptive signaling scheme is the peSSE 
(Xu et al., 2015). However, this static signaling scheme 
optimizes the rate of deception for perfectly rational 
adversaries and is not personalized to individuals. 
Here we advance this research by developing a 
dynamic and personalized signaling scheme using 
cognitive modeling. A cognitive model based on a 
theory of experiential-choice (Instance-Based Learning 
Theory; IBLT), implemented in a cognitive architecture 
(Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational; ACT-R), and 
validated using human experimentation with deceptive 
signals informs the development of a cognitive 
signaling scheme. The predictions of the cognitive 
model show that the proposed solution increases the 
compliance to deceptive signals beyond the peSSE. 
These predictions were verified in human experiments, 
and the results shed additional light on human 
reactions towards adaptive deceptive signals. 
1. Introduction 
In cybersecurity, static defense strategies (e.g., 
intrusion detection, firewalls, anti-malware, or anti-
virus) are effective front-line defenses that prevent 
many attacks. Despite their effectiveness, many attacks 
still succeed as adversaries continuously adapt to find 
and exploit new vulnerabilities. It is imperative to 
develop security defenses that thwart attacks before 
they occur and that adapt to ever-evolving adversaries. 
One way to actively prevent attacks is to employ 
signaling schemes based on game-theoretic algorithms. 
Security analysists can actively monitor a network 
for fraudulent activity. However, resources are often 
limited, and a network cannot be fully monitored all 
the time, therefore signaling can aid in protecting 
unprotected resources. Signaling is a defense method 
whereby information is sent to an attacker that reveals 
the protection status of a potential target. Truthful 
signals can deter some attacks, but employing 
deceptive tactics can increase the perceived coverage 
of unprotected targets by finding the correct balance 
between truthful and deceptive signals [1]. 
Deception is a form of persuasion where one 
intentionally misleads an agent into a false belief, in 
order to gain an advantage over the agent and achieve 
one’s goals [2]. Deception is often used for ill-gains, 
for example, in spear-phishing attacks or 
disinformation campaigns. However, it can also be 
used for good, to mitigate unwanted behavior or illegal 
activity, much like signage in a front lawn may deter 
would-be thieves even if no physical security system 
truly exists. In cybersecurity, deceptive signals can be 
used to deter attacks on uncovered systems beyond any 
capabilities of static defenses that do not use signaling 
or only use truthful signals. 
Finding the right balance of deceptive signaling so 
that the attacker continues to believe the signal is 
crucial to the success of the strategy. Recently, game-
theoretic research on deceptive signaling algorithms in 
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) has optimized the 
strategic allocation of limited defenses and the rate of 
deception so that a rational attacker would not attack 
when presented a signal [3]. However, this research 
optimized signaling for perfectly rational adversaries, 
and humans exhibit, at best, bounded rationality [4]. 
Deception is a tool used to trick the human mind, 
and as such, a better understanding of how would-be 
attackers react to and learn from deceptive tactics is 
important for developing effective cyber defenses. To 
these ends, we examined human behavior in a cyber-
security game called the Insider Attack Game (IAG) 
that pits humans, who play the role of an inside-
attacker, against cybersecurity analysts controlled by 
an algorithm. Results of laboratory experiments, and a 
cognitive model that accurately predicts human 
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performance in the IAG, show that humans behave far 
differently than predicted under assumptions of perfect 
rationality [1][5-7]. Humans exhibit nominally 
irrational behaviors that reflect capacity and 
information limitations, and the need to resort to 
heuristic strategies, that result in cognitive biases (e.g., 
confirmation bias). While signaling algorithms 
optimized for perfectly rational adversaries do improve 
defense compared to not signaling at all [3], they are 
less than effective against boundedly rational humans. 
One reason for the algorithms’ shortcomings is that 
they are static and not personalized to individuals. 
While humans are not perfectly rational, they learn 
quickly and can adjust behavior in real time. A 
signaling scheme that is adaptive to the individual can 
potentially outperform traditional signaling schemes. 
Based on our understanding of human behavior 
response to deceptive signaling in the IAG, through 
experimentation and cognitive modeling, we propose a 
signaling scheme that is adaptive to an individual’s 
experience. The signaling scheme is designed to both 
exploit and maintain the attacker’s belief in the signal. 
In what follows, we first describe a signaling 
scheme that is optimized for and effective against 
perfectly rational adversaries, and how an approach 
based on cognitive modeling would differ. Next, we 
describe an online game that was developed to 
investigate human behavior response to deceptive 
signaling. Results from humans playing the game, and 
a cognitive model that accurately predicts their 
performance, provide key insights that lead to the 
design of a signaling scheme that is grounded in 
principles of human cognition. The scheme is 
predicted, via the cognitive model, to be more effective 
against boundedly rational humans than traditional 
schemes. The results of a laboratory experiment show 
that the signaling scheme is effective at increasing 
compliance with the signal compared to traditional 
schemes, but humans still attack more often than 
predicted by the model. The human behavior results 
are compared with those of the cognitive model to shed 
light on human response to deceptive signals, guide 
avenues of future research, and aid in the development 
of more effective signaling schemes. 
2. Deceptive signaling for cybersecurity 
In cybersecurity, deception has been adopted across 
many security techniques with much success, for 
example, in the strategic allocation of honeypots [8] 
and masking the properties of systems [9]. Using 
deceptive signals in Stackelberg Security Games also 
has great potential for use in cybersecurity. 
SSGs model the interaction between an attacker 
and a defender using a game-theoretic framework. In 
the SSG, a defender plays a particular strategy (i.e., 
random patrolling of an airport terminal), the attacker 
observes the strategy, and then the attacker takes 
action. Under this framework, researchers have 
developed algorithms, such as the Strong Stackelberg 
Equilibrium (SSE), that optimally allocates limited 
defense resources across a set of targets [10]. These 
algorithms have been applied successfully across a 
number of physical security systems (e.g., protecting 
ports, scheduling air marshals, and mitigating 
poachers) [10-13]. Such security practices could be 
applied to the cyber realm, for example, in scheduling 
active monitoring of security systems by network 
administrators (e.g., security analysts). 
Xu and colleagues [3] extended the SSG models by 
incorporating elements of signaling, in which a 
defender (sender) strategically reveals information 
about their strategy to the attacker (receiver) in order to 
influence the attacker’s decision making [14-15]. 
Sending a message that reveals the protection status of 
target can influence attacker behavior. For example, a 
truthful message that reveals a target is monitored can 
deter attacks, but adversaries can attack with impunity 
when a message reveals the target is not monitored. 
However, defenders can use a combination of truthful 
and deceptive signals to help deter attacks on the 
unprotected resources. Xu et al.’s [3] solution, the 
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium with Persuasion 
(peSSE), improves defense against a perfectly rational 
attacker compared to strategies that do not use 
signaling. For a given target, the peSSE finds the 
optimal combination of bluffing (sending a deceptive 
message that the target is monitored when it is not) and 
truth-telling (sending a truthful message that the target 
is covered) so that a rational attacker would not attack 
in the presence of a signal. 
In practice, the SSE allocates defenses 
proportionally across the set of targets so that the 
expected values of all targets are equal. Once defenses 
are scheduled, the attacker can choose a target to 
attack. Then, as determined by the peSSE, the defender 
will send a signal to the attacker revealing the 
protection status of the target, which may sometimes 
be deceptive. Based on this information, the attacker 
can then choose to continue the attack or withdraw. If 
the attacker continues the attack, then they will receive 
a penalty if the target is truly monitored, but a reward 
if the target is open. The peSSE sends deceptive 
signals at a rate that makes the expected value of 
attacking a target, given a signal, equal to the expected 
value of withdrawing the attack, or zero. Therefore, 
under the assumption of perfect rationality, when 
presented with a signal an attacker will always break 
ties in favor of the defender and choose the safer 
option, to withdraw the attack. 
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Figure 1. Screenshot of the IAG (A) and an example signal message (B). 
Unfortunately, the peSSE is less than optimal 
against humans that do not always make the rational 
best decision [6-7]. The signaling scheme can be 
improved by taking into account cognitive dynamics 
and biases that influence decisions making. What is 
needed for a cognitive-based signaling scheme is a 
computational or mathematical model of human 
reactions in all circumstances. The adaptive scheme 
can then use that model to dynamically optimize signal 
presentation given previous events and responses. 
3. Insider Attack Game 
The Insider Attack Game (IAG) is an online game 
designed to investigate the interaction between an 
attacker and defender in a cybersecurity scenario, gain 
a better understanding of how humans react to 
deceptive signals, and assess the effectiveness of 
various signaling schemes [5][7]. Figure 1(A) shows a 
screenshot of the game interface. Players take the role 
of the attacker at the center of the screen (i.e., a 
company employee) and their goal is to score points by 
“hacking” computers to steal proprietary data. There 
are six computers from which to choose to attack, but 
only two security analysts (i.e., defenders controlled by 
a computer algorithm) that can monitor one computer 
each. If the player attacks a computer that is monitored, 
they lose points denoted by the number of red stars, but 
if the computer is not monitored then they win points 
denoted by the number of yellow stars. Each computer 
shows its reward for winning, penalty for losing, and 
the probability that the computer is being monitored 
(which reflects the SSE for the game). 
Players make repeated attempts at attacking 
computers. On each turn, the player must first select a 
computer to attack. Then, the signaling algorithm 
determines whether to send a truthful signal or a 
deceptive signal. In the IAG with six targets and two 
analysts, the peSSE presents a signal every time a 
target is monitored, or 33% of trials on average. 
Additionally, the peSSE sends a signal half of the time 
when a target is not monitored, or 33% of trials on 
average. This means that, on average, a signal is 
deceptive half of the time. At this rate, the expected 
value of attacking given a signal is zero, the same 
expected value as withdrawing the attack. Therefore, a 
perfectly rational adversary that only attacks with a 
positive expected value (i.e., in the absence of a 
signal), is predicted to attack on 33% of trials on 
average (i.e., when a signal is not presented). 
Figure 1(B) shows an example message signaling 
that a target is currently being monitored. If the 
computer is not being monitored, then the first line of 
the message is omitted. After reading the message, the 
player must decide whether to continue their attack or 
withdraw and earn zero points. Players play four 
rounds of 25 trials each (after an initial five trials of 
practice). The payoff structures and monitoring 
probabilities of the targets are different in each round. 
Coverage and signaling of targets were precomputed 
for each trial. Therefore, each individual player 
experiences the same coverage and signaling schedule. 
3.1. Understanding human behavior in the IAG 
Cranford et al. [6-7] presented the results of 100 
human participants playing the IAG against the peSSE 
signaling scheme and a cognitive model of an attacker 
that accurately predicts human performance and helps 
explain human behavior. 
Figure 2 shows the mean probability of attack 
across trials. The dashed line at the bottom of the graph 
shows the predicted probability of attack of a perfectly 
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rational adversary (33%). The results showed that 
humans attacked far more often than predicted, almost 
80% of trials. Figure 3 displays the probability of 
attack on trials when a signal is presented, showing 
that humans attack more than 70% of trials while a 
perfectly rational adversary would never attack. 
 
Figure 2. Mean probability of attack across trials and 
rounds in the IAG for humans compared to the 
model, playing against the peSSE. 
 
Figure 3. Mean probability of attack when a signal is 
present, comparing humans and model playing the 
IAG against the peSSE. 
It is clear that humans do not make perfectly 
rational decisions. Instead, human behavior can be 
explained as decisions from experience [16]. To better 
understand the cognitive process underlying human 
decision making, a cognitive model was built in the 
ACT-R cognitive architecture [17-18] and decisions 
are made following instance-based learning theory 
(IBLT) [16]. According to IBLT, decisions are made 
by generalizing across past experiences, or instances, 
that are similar to the current situation. For the IAG, 
instances are represented by the features of the 
decision. This includes the context of the selected 
target, the decision, and the outcome. The context 
includes the monitoring probability [0.0, 1.0], reward 
[1, 10], and penalty values [-1, -10] associated with the 
selected target, and whether a warning signal was 
presented [present, absent]. The possible decisions are 
attack or withdraw, and the outcome is the reward or 
penalty based on the decision. In a given situation, for 
each possible decision, an associated utility is 
computed through blended memory retrieval weighted 
by contextual similarity to past instances. The decision 
with the highest expected utility is made. However, 
withdrawing always results in zero points. Therefore, 
the model only needs to determine the utility of 
attacking in order to make a choice. 
In ACT-R, the retrieval of past instances is based 
on the activation strength of the relevant instance in 
memory and its similarity to the current context. The 
activation of an instance reflects the power law of 
practice and forgetting, and includes a partial matching 
process reflecting the similarity between the current 
context elements and the corresponding context 
elements for the instance in memory. A variance 
parameter s introduces stochasticity in retrieval. 
Similarities between numeric slot values are computed 
on a linear scale from 0.0, an exact match, to -1.0. 
Symbolic values are either an exact match or 
maximally different, -2.5, to prevent bleeding between 
memories for different actions and signal types. 
A Boltzmann softmax equation determines the 
probability of retrieving an instance based on its 
activation strength. The IBL model uses ACT-R’s 
blending mechanism [16][19] to calculate an expected 
outcome of attacking a target based on a consensus of 
past instances. The expected outcome is the value that 
best satisfies the constraints of all matching instances 
weighted by their probability of retrieval. 
In summary, the outcomes of past instances are 
weighted by their recency, frequency, and similarity to 
the current instance to produce an expected outcome. If 
the value is greater than zero then the model attacks, 
else it withdraws. 
For each trial, the model first selects a target with 
the highest expected outcome, generated via blending, 
and then decides whether to continue the attack or 
withdraw based on whether a signal was presented. For 
this decision, the model uses blending to generate an 
expected outcome for the given target, but only on the 
basis of the signal and ignores the values of the target 
context (i.e., the target information is occluded from 
the participants, so it is plausible that they do not 
consider the target information beyond deciding which 
target to select initially). An instance is then saved in 
memory that represents the model’s expected outcome. 
Humans tend to remember not only the actual 
experience, but also their expectations prior to the 
experience [20]. This results in additional positive (or 
negative) instances, which in turn generates a 
confirmation bias whereby one’s pre-conception of 
winning (or losing) perpetuates itself in future trials, 
even when it is actually disconfirmed. Based on the 
value of the expected outcome, a decision is made, and 
the action and outcome slots of the current instance are 
updated to reflect the action taken by the model and the 
ground-truth outcome. This final instance is saved in 
memory and thereby influences future decisions. 
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The model continues for four rounds of 25 trials 
each. The model behavior reflects its experiences. If an 
action results in a positive/negative outcome, then its 
future expectations will be increased/decreased, and 
the model will be more/less likely to select and attack 
that target in the future. Also, the impact of a particular 
past experience on future decisions strengthens with 
frequency and weakens with time. 
The model was run 1000 times to simulate a 
population of individuals and to generate stable 
estimates of human performance. As shown in Figures 
2 and 3, the model is highly accurate at predicting 
human performance (total RMSE = 0.04), even 
matching the trial-to-trial variations that reflect the 
underlying coverage and signaling schedules (total r = 
0.73), and that accuracy increases over time. Not only 
does the model match the average human performance 
in the IAG, but it also matches well to the individual 
performance. Figure 4 shows the distribution of 
participants by their mean probability of attack. Like 
humans, some model simulations attack at a fairly low 
rate, while a large proportion attack 95% of the time or 
more. Figure 5 shows the distribution for when a signal 
present, and indicates that some participants comply 
with the signal, to a degree, while most do not. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of participants by probability of 
attack for humans compared to the model playing 
the IAG against the peSSE. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of participants by probability of 
attack when a signal is present, comparing humans 
and model playing the IAG against the peSSE. 
Human decision making in the IAG is largely 
influenced by memory dynamics across past 
experiences. The peSSE suffers because human biases 
(e.g., recency, frequency, and confirmation) lead to 
overweighting of certain outcomes that, often, results 
in inflated expectations. Humans fail to fully comply 
with the signal because they are more likely to expect a 
positive outcome than a negative one as belief in the 
signal deteriorates. While deception is an effective tool 
for preventing malicious behaviors, the experience of 
successfully calling a bluff can reduce compliance with 
the signal. Regaining trust in the signal is difficult if 
not impossible to do under static signaling schemes. 
Therefore, an adaptive signaling scheme is needed that 
adjusts the rate of deception to dynamically balance 
(re)building trust in the signal and exploiting it, and 
thus optimizes compliance. 
4. Cognitive signaling scheme for adaptive 
cyber defense 
Individual attackers behave differently from one 
another, and each may learn and adjust behavior after 
repeated experience with deceptive signals. Therefore, 
an adaptive signaling scheme based on cognitive 
principles can be used to adjust the rate of deception, 
tailored to an individual’s behavior, so as to maintain 
belief in the signal. Our initial solution towards this 
problem is to interleave blocks of trials with only 
truthful signals between blocks of trials with deceptive 
signals. The assumption is that experiences of rewards 
when a signal is present increases the probability of 
attacking in the future, while experiences of penalties 
given a signal reduces the probability of attacking in 
the future. Therefore, eliminating deceptive signals for 
a short period of time can help increase penalties and 
restore belief in the signal. The goal for the cognitive 
signaling scheme is to induce, and preserve, the belief 
that attacking given a signal will result in a loss. 
Relying on the attacker’s history of behavior, this 
new cognitive signaling scheme estimates the current 
probability of attack given a signal and judges whether 
the cost of issuing a truthful block outweighs the 
benefits of a deceptive block, to effectively reduce the 
future probability of attack given a signal. At the 
beginning of each block of trials, a closed form 
equation of the current probability of attack given a 
signal, reflecting the blending process used in 
generating expectations and the recency and frequency 
power laws in chunk activations, can be formulated 
based on the times t since past actual decisions made 
by the attacker, as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆 =
 𝑡𝑖
−𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑖 +  𝑡𝑗
−𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑗  
 𝑡𝑖
−𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑖 +  𝑡𝑗
−𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑗 +  𝑡𝑘
−𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑠
𝑘
  (1) 
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Next, we estimate the change in probability of 
attack given a signal from a truthful block. Therefore, 
we need to make an additional assumption as to how 
wins and losses impact choice. We assume that the 
attacker will follow the same decision-making process, 
keeping the same format reflecting probability 
matching behavior: 
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆 =
 𝑡𝑖
−𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑖  
 𝑡𝑖
−𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑖 +  𝑡𝑗
−𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑗
  (2) 
The impact of a truthful block of size b on 
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆    results in a new estimate 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝐴 𝑆  with 
an expected number 1/3 ∗ 𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆  of losses 
distributed randomly across the block, where 1/3 is the 
mean probability of sending a signal in a truthful 
block. For the present implementation, the block size b 
is set to 10. This value was chosen as a reasonable 
compromise that provides enough opportunities for 
switching blocks while allowing for enough experience 
within a block to impact behavior. 
The adaptive cognitive signaling scheme is as 
follows: the next block will use a truthful signal if the 
following comparison of the cost in terms of additional 
attacks allowed in the next block is less than its 
benefits (i.e., the number of attacks saved in the 
remaining r trials during the rest of the experiment 
after that block): 
 
1
3
∗ 𝑏 ∗  1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆                                            
< 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟 ∗  𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜𝑤  𝐴 𝑆 − 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝐴 𝑆   
 (3) 
Where 1/3 is the difference in probability of a signal 
being generated between deceptive (66%) and truthful 
blocks (33%), and  is a discount parameter that can 
take any value between 0.0 and 1.0 (default is 1/3). The 
discount parameter is an assumption of how long the 
impact of the truthful block on the probability of attack 
given a signal will persist. If we assume that it will 
persist until the end and all future blocks will be 
deceptive blocks, then the right value would be 2/3 
(i.e., the percentage of trials when a signal is 
generated). If it would persist indefinitely but all future 
blocks are truthful blocks, then that value would be 
1/3. In practice, it will be somewhere between 1/3 and 
2/3 depending of the mix of truthful and deceptive. The 
effect of the signal will dilute over time, so the 
minimum 1/3 is a reasonable default value. 
In summary, the cognitive signaling scheme uses a 
closed form version of the model decision procedure to 
optimize the tradeoff between the cost of building trust 
in the signal using blocks of truthful signals, and the 
benefits of exploiting that trust in future blocks of 
deceptive signals. 
4.1. Cognitive model predictions and human 
performance against cognitive signaling 
The effectiveness of the cognitive signaling scheme 
was examined through cognitive model simulations 
and a human behavioral experiment. The cognitive 
model of the attacker presented above was run through 
1000 simulations against the cognitive signaling 
scheme, and these predictions were then compared to 
performance of human participants. For the human 
experiment, 100 participants were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. All participants resided in 
the United States. For completing the experiment and 
submitting a completion code, participants were paid 
$1 plus $0.01 per point earned in the game, up to a 
maximum of $5.50. One participant was removed from 
analysis because of incomplete data due to data 
recording errors, resulting in a final N of 99. For 
brevity, details of the experimental design can be found 
in Cranford et al. [7]. 
As an initial study, all players began with a block 
of truthful signals to establish baseline belief in the 
signal. As before, players played four rounds of trials 
each, with a different set of targets each round. Every 
10 trials overall the algorithm determined whether to 
switch to a different type of block: either using only 
truthful signals or using deception according to the 
peSSE. Figure 6 shows the proportion of players that 
received a truthful block, across each of the 10 blocks 
in the game. The first block is always a truthful block. 
From there, depending on the individual’s behavior, 
the cognitive signaling scheme assigns more truthful or 
deceptive blocks. The second block is always 
deceptive, and the third block is about evenly divided 
between truthful and deceptive. Over time, the 
proportion of truthful blocks declines because the 
estimated reduction in future probability of attack over 
the remaining blocks does not outweigh the near-term 
term costs of the truthful block. Overall, the probability 
of assigning truthful blocks is higher for humans than 
for the model, suggesting that humans are less trusting 
in the signal and more willing to attack. 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of truthful blocks assigned by 
the cognitive signaling scheme per block of 10 trials 
for humans compared to the model. 
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To assess human and model performance, the data 
was analyzed for the probability of attack across trials. 
The probability of attack was calculated as the 
proportion of players that continued the attack on a 
given trial. Figure 7 shows the probability of attack 
across trials for humans compared to the model when 
playing against the cognitive signaling scheme, which 
is compared to human performance when playing 
against the peSSE. Compared to the peSSE, the 
cognitive signaling scheme further reduces the 
probability of attack, but at the expense of giving up 
more attacks in the first block. Because all signals are 
truthful in the first block of the cognitive signaling 
condition, fewer signals are sent to deter attacks 
overall. The effect of an initial truthful block is 
immediately observable by a relatively lower 
probability of attack in trials 10 through 20 (which is 
always a deceptive block), and this trend continues 
through the game. The effect of the cognitive signaling 
scheme is more prominent in the model. As can be 
seen, humans attack more often than predicted by the 
model. Because humans tend to attack more than the 
model, the cognitive signaling scheme also presents 
more truthful blocks to humans (see Figure 6 above). 
To assess the effectiveness of the signaling scheme, 
we examine defender utility. The defender is penalized 
one point every time the player attacks a target that is 
not monitored, and zero points otherwise (e.g., if a 
player attacks a target that is monitored, or does not 
attack). This means, the more often players attack in 
the face of a deceptive signal, the worse will be 
defender utility. Since targets are not monitored 66% 
of trials on average, a defender utility less than -17 
(i.e., >2/3 of 25 trials) means the signaling scheme is 
better than a purely truthful signaling scheme, while a 
utility greater than -9 is ideal (i.e., <1/3 of 25 trials). 
While the cognitive signaling scheme reduces attacks, 
as displayed in Figure 8, defender utility is only 
marginally improved compared to the peSSE and much 
lower compared to model predictions. Compared to the 
model and the peSSE, more truthful signals were given 
to humans overall under cognitive signaling. This 
resulted in fewer signals sent to deter attacks on 
uncovered targets and consequently more free passes to 
attack with impunity, even though overall compliance 
with the signal is increased. 
At first glance, these results indicate that the 
cognitive signaling scheme is not as effective as 
predicted. However, a closer inspection of the results 
revealed that the scheme is effective at influencing 
human behavior beyond the peSSE, for some humans. 
As shown in the histogram in Figure 9, the model fails 
to account for approximately 44% of participants that 
attacked at a rate of 95% or more. However, as shown 
in Figure 10, if we separate participants into two 
Figure 7. Mean probability of attack across trials and 
rounds in the IAG for humans and the model playing 
against the cognitive signaling scheme, which are 
compared to humans playing against the peSSE. 
 
Figure 8. Defender utility for the cognitive signaling 
scheme compared to the peSSE. 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of participants by probability of 
attack for humans compared to the model playing 
the IAG against the cognitive signaling scheme. 
 
Figure 10. Mean probability of attack across trials 
and rounds in the IAG for humans compared to the 
model playing against the cognitive signaling scheme, 
separating humans that attack >=95% and <95%. 
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groups, the model is highly accurate at predicting 
performance of the approximately 56% of participants 
that attack at a rate less than 95%. 
For the participants that attacked at a rate greater 
than 95%, the cognitive signaling scheme did not 
influence behavior even after giving these participants, 
almost exclusively, truthful blocks. Figure 11 shows 
the proportion of truthful blocks assigned per block of 
10 trials for the two separate groups. The cognitive 
signaling scheme presented the same proportion of 
truthful blocks to the model as it did those participants 
that attacked less than 95% of the time. However, the 
scheme continued to present truthful blocks to the 
other group of participants because they continued 
attacking undeterred in the face of a signal. 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of truthful blocks assigned by 
the cognitive signaling scheme per block of 10 trials 
comparing the model to humans that attack >=95% 
and to those that attack <95%. 
As shown in Figure 12, the cognitive signaling 
scheme provides better defense for a subset of humans, 
as indicated by low defender utility values that match 
what was predicted by the model. However, against 
some participants the scheme performs about as poorly 
as would be expected given no signals. 
 
Figure 12. Defender utility for the cognitive signaling 
scheme, comparing the model to humans that 
attack >=95% and to those that attack <95%. 
In fact, in a post-experiment survey that asked an 
open-ended question about what strategy participants 
used when faced with a signal, a majority of 
participants that attacked more than 95% responded 
that they ignored the signal. An informal analysis was 
conducted with two independent coders, and the 
responses were categorized based on the features in 
which decisions were based or the reported actions 
taken. Discrepancies between coders were resolved 
through discussion. The results are presented in Figure 
13 comparing responses of participants that attacked 
greater than 95% to those that attacked less than 95%. 
For the former group, almost 23% reported that they 
ignored the signal while another ~10% reported that 
they always attacked. Approximately 10% reported 
that they stay and continue attacking the same target 
even after suffering a loss, while about 15% switch to 
another target and continue attacking. Meanwhile, for 
the latter group, none reported that they ignore the 
signal, while approximately 20% reported that they 
withdraw in the face of a signal, and ~12% withdraw if 
the monitoring probability was high. Overall, the 
survey results show that some participants ignore the 
signal and treat all instances equally. This means that 
the signaling scheme will not be effective against these 
participants because the expected value of attacking 
given a signal is combined with the expected value of 
attacking given no signal. Therefore, with only 2 
analysts, the overall expected values would be positive, 
resulting in constant attacks. 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of reported attack strategies 
in the IAG for humans that attack >=95% 
compared to those that attack < 95%. 
Based on these findings, we created a version of the 
cognitive model that does not consider the signal when 
generating an expected outcome of attacking the 
selected target. For this version, blending samples 
equally across past instances regardless of the signal, 
and so only recency and frequency of past instances 
play a role in decisions. The model attacks on 96.0% of 
trials (SD = 15.1%), with 54% of simulations attacking 
100% of trials and 35.8% attacking greater than 95%, 
matching well to the distribution shown in Figure 9 of 
the humans that attack >=95%, and the other measures 
(see Figures 10-12). These results stress the importance 
of understanding the features that individuals consider 
in their decisions, since one’s representation of the 
decision context strongly influences the chosen action. 
Page 1892
  
5. General Discussion 
In this paper, we improved upon traditional game-
theoretic signaling schemes for cyber defense using a 
computational model of human cognition. The peSSE 
signaling scheme offers effective defense against 
boundedly rational human adversaries compared to not 
signaling. However, the algorithm optimizes the rate of 
deception for perfectly rational adversaries, which 
results in a static scheme that is not personalized to 
individual attackers. Through experimentation and 
cognitive modeling, we learned how humans respond 
to deceptive signals, and developed a cognitive 
signaling scheme that is adaptive and based on 
cognitive principles. Cognitive model predictions 
showed that the solution is promising at further 
influencing human behavior beyond the capabilities of 
the peSSE. These predictions were verified in human 
experiments, and the results helped shed additional 
light on individual differences in human behavior. 
The cognitive model predicts human decisions are 
made by aggregated retrieval across past experiences 
based on the similarity to the current situation [16]. 
These decisions are influenced by frequency and 
recency of past experiences, cognitive biases, and 
representation of information in memory. These are the 
core assumptions for the cognitive signaling scheme. 
Two key insights gleaned from the cognitive model 
regarding human behavior, are that: (1) decisions are 
highly affected by confirmation bias, and (2) it is 
important to consider what features the individual 
factors in their decision. The cognitive signaling 
scheme leveraged this information to induce bias and 
influence human behavior. Specifically, by relying on 
observations of actual human behavior, the cognitive 
signaling scheme estimated the probability of attack 
given a signal and, if it was too high, would send only 
truthful signals for a period of time in an attempt to 
rebuild trust in the signal and ultimately increase 
compliance. Continued attacks given truthful signals 
should strengthen the expectation that attacking in the 
future, given a signal, will result in a loss. 
An open question for the cognitive signaling 
scheme is how long do we need to display truthful 
signals to regain trust, and thus compliance? Currently, 
the approach gives up some attacks early on with an 
initial truthful block, but this is done in order to 
increase belief in the signal for the rest of the 
experiment. The algorithm only determines whether to 
switch to a different type of signal after a block of 10 
trials. Ten is a reasonable value, but the algorithm 
could be called as often as every trial. The implications 
of this are unclear at this point. It could result in too 
few truthful signals in a row to impact behavior, or it 
could help further personalize the scheme so that it is 
better adapted to the individual. Future research is 
aimed at exploring ways to optimize the proportion of 
truthful to deceptive signals over a period of time. 
Cranford et al. [7] showed that humans seem to 
ignore the context of the selected target, and only 
consider the signal when making decisions of whether 
to continue to attack. This insight allowed us to 
simplify the cognitive signaling scheme and focus on 
reducing the overall probability of attack given a 
signal, and not need to take into account individual 
target values. Afterall, the SSE normalizes targets, so 
their expected values are equal [10]. 
An important observation from the human 
experiments was that the cognitive signaling scheme is 
only effective for some participants, while others seem 
to ignore the signal when making decisions. This 
further highlights the importance of accurately 
representing decision features. For participants that do 
not consider the signal, all targets are treated equally. 
Thus, trying to reduce the probability of attack given a 
signal by adjusting the rate of deception may prove 
fruitless when the overall expected values are positive 
for all targets. An alternative, method to combat such 
adversaries could be to shift coverage instead of, or in 
addition to, adjusting the rate of deception. For 
example, while it might be difficult or impossible to 
extract attack preferences to influence behavior, it 
might be possible to extract selection preferences and 
shift coverage to induce more experiences of loss given 
a signal. Driving the expected value of attacking to 
negative values could result in attackers starting to pay 
attention to the signal, which in turn would raise the 
effectiveness of cognitive signaling. Future research is 
aimed at exploring the potential of this method. 
Another limitation of the current approach is that it 
relies only on deceiving when given a signal. 
Meanwhile, players can attack with impunity when no 
signal is presented. An alternative approach is to use 
deception two ways, when a signal is present and when 
it is absent. In this way, the attacker can lose points 
when a signal is absent, instilling further uncertainty in 
their decisions. In fact, recent research explored several 
game-theoretic algorithms that employ two-way 
deception that proved better than one-way deception 
against human participants [1]. Future research is 
aimed at exploring the potential of using two-way 
deception in the current cognitive signaling approach. 
We have already used two-way deception in an 
alternative cognitive signal scheme, but it has not been 
tested against human participants [6]. In that scheme, 
the cognitive model is used to trace human behavior in 
real time to make predictions about the human’s 
probability of attack given a signal, and determines on 
a trial-to-trial basis whether to give a signal based on 
the underlying coverage. The scheme shows potential, 
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and the use of two-way signaling is an enhancement 
over the current approach. Where the current approach 
stands out is in the fact that it is a closed-form solution 
that relies on a simplified version of the cognitive 
model to make predictions of individual behavior. 
However, there is room to refine the current cognitive 
signaling approach through the discount parameter, the 
size of the truthful block, and the assumptions 
concerning the likelihood of various coverage 
conditions. Future research will further explore the 
complexities of the cognitive signaling scheme. 
One caveat to these approaches is that they rely on 
observing and tracking an individual’s behavior. In the 
real world, it may prove difficult if not impossible to 
track all, or even some, of an adversary’s actions. 
Luckily the methods are robust and can be tailored to a 
population, sub-group, or even a time-window of 
attacks. While not as effective as at the individual 
level, such a method could still reliably influence 
human behavior. 
In conclusion, we have outlined an initial approach 
to deceptive signaling for cyber defense that relies on 
cognitive models of attacker behavior to balance the 
rate of deception in an attempt to keep belief in the 
signal high. The cognitive signaling scheme is adaptive 
and personalized, and can therefore be used to induce 
biases and influence attackers to comply with the 
signal beyond the capabilities of any static scheme. 
Future research is aimed at improving upon the current 
cognitive signaling scheme. 
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